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Abstract: Tax evasion, particularly in developing countries is a debatable issue. Evasion is a disease and
needs to be minimized so that the black economy or hidden economy can be mitigated. This paper
attempts to reveal the determinants of  tax evasion from the institutional perspectives. The objective of
this study is to identify the determinants of  tax evasion a decade after the introduction of  a Self-Assess-
ment System (SAS). Three institutional perspectives of  the determinants of  tax evasion were examined,
namely the probability of being detected, the role of the tax authority and the complexity of the tax
system. The results suggested that the complexity of  the system, and the probability of  being detected
had a significant impact on tax evasion. The results of this study could possibly contribute to the body of
knowledge in lieu of combating tax evasion, as well as being an input to tax administrators and policymakers
into which ways the determinants can affect compliance. The findings also provide an indicator for tax
administrators of the relative importance of the tax system in assisting with the design of tax education
programs, simplifying tax systems and developing a wider understanding of  taxpayers’ behavior.
Abstrak: Penggelapan pajak, khususnya di negara-negara berkembang adalah isu yang dapat diperdebatkan.
Penggelapan adalah penyakit dan harus diminimalkan sehingga ekonomi hitam atau ekonomi tersembunyi
dapat dimitigasi. Paper ini mencoba untuk mengungkapkan beberapa determinan penggelapan pajak dari
perspektif  kelembagaan. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengidentifikasi berbagai determinan
penggelapan pajak satu dekade setelah pengenalan Self-Assessment System (SAS). Tiga perspektif  kelembagaan
determinan penggelapan pajak dikaji, yaitu probabilitas terdeteksi, peran autoritas pajak, dan kompleksitas
sistem pajak. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kompleksitas sistem, dan probabilitas dapat terdeteksi
berdampak signifikan pada penggelapan pajak. Hasil penelitian ini mungkin dapat berkontribusi pada
pokok ilmu pengetahuan sebagai pengganti memerangi penggelapan pajak, serta menjadi masukan untuk
administrator pajak dan pembuat kebijakan tentang cara-cara beberapa determinan mempengaruhi
kepatuhan. Temuan ini juga memberikan indikator untuk administrator pajak penyederhanaan pentingnya
relatif sistem pajak dalam membantu dengan desain program pendidikan pajak, penyederhanaan sistem
pajak dan pengembangan pemahaman yang lebih luas tentang perilaku pembayar pajak.
Keywords:  black economy; hidden economy; institutional factors; self assessment system; tax
evasion
 JEL classification: H25, H26, K2
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Introduction
Paying taxes is not a favorite of all of
us, but for the government, and in particular
its revenue agencies, tax collection is an im-
portant activity. Many of  us would argue why
must we pay taxes? In what ways does the
amount paid in taxes benefit us as a nation?
Understanding the spirit behind the tax pay-
ment is vital. Tax is defined as a compulsory
payment to the authorized bodies and yet no
implicit rewards are received by the payer
(Lymer and Oats 2009).
On the other hand, avoiding tax liabili-
ties could be defined in various ways. Tax
evasion or non-compliance describes a range
of  activities that are unfavorable to a state’s
tax system. These include tax avoidance,
which refers to reducing taxes by legal means,
and tax evasion which refers to the criminal
non-payment of  tax liabilities. Groups that
do not comply with taxes include tax protest-
ers and tax resisters. Tax resisters typically do
not take the position that the tax laws are
themselves illegal or do not apply to them,
and they are more concerned with not paying
for the particular government policies that
they oppose. Tax protesters attempt to evade
the payment of taxes by using trivial inter-
pretations of the tax laws, whilst tax resist-
ers refuse to pay a tax for conscientious rea-
sons.
The exact meaning of tax evasion has
been defined in various ways. Tax evasion is
defined by the United States’ Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) as an intentional misrep-
resentation of  material facts, performed by
the taxpayer with the specific purpose of
evading a tax known or believed to be owed.
Tax avoidance on the other hand is defined
as being intentional, since an act of compli-
ance requires both a tax being due and owed
and a fraudulent intent not to pay it (Ritsatos
2014). Previously, James and Alley (2004)
asserted that noncompliance is more than tax
evasion and it also includes some forms of
tax avoidance. James and Alley define tax
evasion as ‘The attempt to reduce tax liabil-
ity by illegal means’ while tax avoidance is
defined as ‘reducing taxation by legal means’
(p. 28). Lewis (1982: 123) perceived tax eva-
sion as ‘any legal method of  reducing one’s
tax bill’ and tax evasion is ‘illegal tax dodg-
ing.’ Similarly, Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran
(2003) perceived tax evasion as actions which
result in lower taxes than are actually owed
(p. 135) while tax avoidance denotes the tax-
payers’ creativity in arranging his tax affairs
in a proper manner based on the laws and
regulations (any provisions not being vio-
lated) so as to reduce his tax bill, and this is
(or should be) acceptable in the view of the
tax administrator. Kasipillai et al. (2003);
Lewis (1982); Webley (2004); Elffers et al.
(1987) and Andreoni et al. (1998), Ritsatos
(2014) and Stack (2015) express that non-
compliance includes both intentional and
unintentional actions. The latter are normally
due to calculation errors and inadequate tax
knowledge although there are other determi-
nants.
Boll (2015) outlined two major distinc-
tions in intentional tax evasion: 1) Evasion
by commission and 2) evasion by omission.
Evasion by commission requires an action by
the taxpayer, for example claiming deductions
or rebates which mean that if a taxpayer is
making a false claim, he will get a tax saving
(a commission on top of his evading actions).
Conversely, evasion by omission is intentional
and should be classified as seriously as eva-
sion by commission (Lewis 1982). This kind
of evasion requires taxpayers to do nothing
in the tax return (i.e miss something out de-
liberately); for example, one would not report
his casual income or any cash-based income.
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Tax evasion or noncompearance is also in-
fluenced by the intention to disobey
(Damayanti et al. 2015; Aini et al. 2013;
Ernawati and Purnomosidhi 2011).
Defining tax evasion and tax avoidance
is important as it will differentiate between
legal and illegal actions taken by a person.
The negative impacts of evading taxes are
various, for example, the national revenues
would decrease significantly and thus encour-
aging a hidden economy in which inequities
in the economy would be derived. Judging
from the negative impacts of tax evasion, this
paper attempts to provide some measures in
order to reduce tax evasion rates in a devel-
oping country. The focal point of  the study
is on Malaysia, a developing country which
has implemented a self-assessment system, a
system believed to be highly dependent on
the honesty of  the taxpayers in determining
their tax liabilities.
Understanding People’s Behavior
Toward Taxes
First and foremost, a government
should understand the nation’s behavior to-
wards taxes so that the nation would willingly
pay the taxes owed. Paying taxes is a volun-
tary act, even though it is made compulsory
by virtue of the laws and regulations passed
about this. As tax payments require a high
financial commitment in various countries,
especially in developing countries, many tax-
payers are keen to evade taxes rather than
paying the exact amount of tax. Although
many previous studies have suggested vari-
ous determinants which influenced tax eva-
sion, tax evasion is still present in the system
and this could reduce national revenues and
subsequently diminish national development.
Based on Kirchler (2007) the determinants
of tax evasion could be divided into four main
parts, namely 1) economic factors (tax rates,
tax audits and perceptions of government
spending); 2) institutional factors (the role of
the tax authority, the complexity of  the tax
returns and their administration, and the
probability of detection); 3) social factors
(ethics and attitude, perceptions of equity and
fairness, political affiliation and changes in
current government policies, referent groups);
and 4) individual factors (personal financial
constraints, an awareness of the offences and
penalties).
 For example, Kirchler (2007: 3) divided
tax evasion determinants into five categories
and his study was based on psychological and
the tax authority-taxpayers’ views namely, the
political perspectives, the social psychologi-
cal perspectives, the decision making per-
spectives, self-employment and the interac-
tion between the tax authorities and taxpay-
ers. However, discussing all four categories
of  tax evasion determinants would make this
paper unfocused; therefore, this paper will
only discuss tax evasion from the institutional
perspectives. While taxpayers are influenced
by pure economic concerns to either evade
or not evade taxes, evidence suggests that
institutional factors also play an important
role in their compliance decisions. The insti-
tutional factors discussed in this section in-
clude the taxpayers’ perceptions of the effi-
ciency of the tax authority/government, the
complexity of the tax returns and the tax sys-
tem generally, as well as the probability of
being detected.
Role (efficiency) of the tax authority/
government
The role of the tax authority in mini-
mizing the tax gap and increasing voluntary
compliance is clearly very important. In ad-
dition, as an agent of collection, the percep-
tion of the taxpayers towards the government
Palil et al.
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is important. There is a debate in the litera-
ture as to how the effective operation of the
tax system by the tax authorities influences
the taxpayers’ compliance behavior. Research-
ers from different countries have also been
unable to achieve agreement about this is-
sue, which appears to differ from country to
country. In the US for example, the IRS views
tax noncompliance as a big challenge, as the
tax gap has increased tremendously in the last
few decades. In 1976, an IRS report estimated
under reported income was $75 to $100 bil-
lion - about 7 percent to 9 percent of the re-
ported income (IRS 1979a: 11). While
Guttman (1977) and Fiege (1979) estimated
that in reality it was probably higher than this.
Guttman (1994) revealed that in 1993 the tax
gap in the US was more than $170 billion
(around a 70% to 126% increase compared
to the IRS estimate in 1976). Different coun-
tries have proposed and developed different
solutions for the relationship between the
taxpayers’ compliance and their operation of
the tax system.
In Belgium for instance, the total
amount of tax being evaded was estimated
at 20 percent of the income tax (Hasseldine
1993) while across the US, Australia, the
Netherlands and Sweden, surveys revealed
that one quarter of the respondents admit-
ted that they deliberately under-reported their
income (Hasseldine 1993). Hasseldine and Li
(1999) illustrated that the government and
the tax authorities were the main parties that
needed to be continuously efficient in admin-
istering the tax system in order to minimize
tax evasion. Hasseldine and Li also claimed
that governments play a central role through
designing the tax systems, and the specific
enforcement and collection mechanisms
(Hasseldine and Li 1999: 93).
A study conducted by Richardson
(2008) investigated the determinants of  tax
evasion across 47 countries including the
USA, the UK, Argentina, Thailand, Canada,
Chile and Brazil also suggested that govern-
ments have a significant positive impact on
determining tax evasion. Richardson also sug-
gested that governments should increase their
reputations and credibility in order to obtain
trust from their taxpayers. Furthermore, Roth
et al. (1989) suggested that in order to in-
crease compliance, maximize tax revenues
and be respected by the taxpayers, a govern-
ment must first have an economical tax sys-
tem, which is practicable1; they must discour-
age tax evasion and not induce dishonesty;
they must avoid the tendency to dry up the
sources of the taxes and should avoid pro-
voking conflict and raising political difficul-
ties; they should also have a good relation-
ship with the international tax regimes. In
summary, although previous studies (for ex-
ample Roth et al.; Richardson and Hasseldine
and Li) could not provide conclusive results
on the measurable impact of the efficiency
of the governments on compliance, however,
researchers from different countries have dis-
cussed this issue and some authors have de-
scribe how the role of governments in induc-
ing tax evasion is important and relevant to
self-assessment systems (see Richardson
2008; Hasseldine and Li 1999).
A study by Stack (2015) in Ukraine
found that another issue related to tax eva-
sion was that the level of money laundering
activities had increased tremendously since
2007 in the Ukraine. For example two UK
companies and one Cypriot company trans-
ferred a total of €172.5 million and $332.2
million from bank accounts in a Latvian bank
to their accounts in a Ukrainian bank to le-
1 The government have suitable powers (assessment and collection) to administer the tax system .
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galize their funds in the economy. As these
funds were the product of tax evasion in the
UK, the illegal money was then transferred
to local people by creating some ordinary
transactions, including payments in response
to shareholding activities in three Ukrainian
companies. On the other hand, a South Afri-
can firm and a UK firm transferred from ac-
counts at the same Latvian bank a total of
$548.2 million and €204.4 million to the ac-
counts of a Russian in a Ukrainian bank as
an advance (loan) to the respective parties
and the parties were then to legalize the
money by spending it in the Ukrainian
economy.
Probability of detection/audited
Slemrod et al. (1998) investigated the
relationship between the probability of be-
ing detected and the taxpayers’ responses.
The experiment2 indicated that taxpayers’
behavior varied with respect to their level of
income and the probability of being detected.
The later dimension (probability of being
detected) played a significant role in deter-
mining the taxpayers’ evasive behavior. How-
ever, the direction of the relationship (posi-
tive or negative) was not clearly stated by
Slemrod et al. (1988). Moreover, compliance
in respect to the probability of detection3 has
received attention from many researchers in-
cluding Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who
claimed that taxpayers will always declare
their income correctly if the probability of
detection is high. The probability of detec-
tion plays a significant role in reporting be-
havior as taxpayers will declare everything if
they perceive that they will be one of the
auditees in that particular year (Riahi-
Belkaoui 2004; Richardson 2008).
A study by Eisenhauer (2008), investi-
gated tax evasion determinants particularly
in terms of  ethical preferences and risk aver-
sion (high or low audit probability) using three
major data sources: Surveys, audits and ex-
periments, across the United States. The study
also suggested that due to increased evasion
across the USA, tax audits have become more
important as a way of minimizing tax non-
compliance. However, the importance of the
audit programs was not solely determined by
the individuals who were self-employed tax-
payers (as suggested by this study); other
groups of taxpayers (for example employees)
might provide different results and interpre-
tations. The study concluded that individu-
als who are self-employed have a greater op-
portunity to evade than other groups, espe-
cially in light of the low probability of audits
that they faced, coupled with less third-party
withholding of  their income tax liabilities. In
summary, different levels of  probability of
detection provide different degrees of com-
pliance. For example, a high probability of
detection potentially increases compliance
(see Bergman 1998; Eisenhauer 2008), al-
though some authors found contradictory re-
sults in some circumstances (i.e. Young 1994:
Slemrod et al. 2001).
Complexity of the tax systems and its
administration
Another variable under the institutional
factors determining tax evasion is the com-
plexity of  the tax systems. How does a com-
plex tax system discourage people from pay-
2 Using tax returns from two years to compare the differences in reported income, deductions and tax liabilities.
Random sampling was used.
3 The degree or probability rate is defined as the number of tax returns audited divided by total tax returns
received by the tax authority.
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ing taxes? As tax systems have become in-
creasingly more complex over time in many
developed countries, complexity has become
an important determinant of  tax evasion be-
havior. The main feature of  a SAS is the self-
completed tax return which requires at least
a reasonable level of complexity because tax-
payers come from various backgrounds, with
differing levels of income, levels of educa-
tion, and most importantly levels of tax
knowledge. In helping taxpayers to complete
their tax returns accurately, the tax authori-
ties should have come up with a simple, but
comprehensive, tax return and administration
system. The information required in the re-
turn must be at the minimum level needed,
and be readily available from taxpayers’ busi-
ness and personal records.
Silvani and Baer (1997) discussed the
importance of the tax authority having a
simple tax return and system from the tax-
payers’ point of  view. The tax authority may
assume its tax return is simple and easy to
complete but it may not be from the taxpay-
ers’ point of view Although the word ‘simple’
carries multiple interpretations, the majority
of taxpayers require that the tax return should
be as simple as possible. Therefore, it is good
practice, before the final version is delivered
to taxpayers, to ensure that ‘pilot’ tests have
taken place first so that the tax return is re-
ally as simple and easy as it can be.
Some countries for example Denmark,
Canada and New Zealand have been devel-
oping their tax systems to be more taxpayer-
friendly. They have introduced simplified tax
returns by reducing the number of pages to
facilitate and increase voluntary compliance
among taxpayers (Mohani 2001: Mohani and
Sheehan 2003, 2004). In the UK for example,
HMRC has tried to present more simplified
tax returns that ordinary people can under-
stand better. In 2007, the tax return was ac-
companied by a 35 page guide on how to com-
plete the tax return and that did not even in-
clude the 8 extra pages of notes that also
needed to be considered by some taxpayers
(HMRC 2009). The form and its accompa-
nying guide has now been simplified to fa-
cilitate taxpayers, in particular by computer-
izing this process so that only context-sensi-
tive details are needed as the taxpayers com-
plete their returns. This significantly simpli-
fied the range of guidance the taxpayer is
exposed to, keeping it to the necessary mini-
mum.
Another point of view is that by sim-
plifying the tax return, this will encourage
taxpayers to complete the tax return on their
own rather than employing a tax agent and
thus reducing the compliance costs (Silvani
and Baer 1997). Previous studies have evi-
denced that the complexity of the reporting
requirements had a high association with the
errors detected by audits (Long 1988). This
finding (by Long) is perhaps to be expected
by the tax authorities. If  many errors are de-
tected in tax returns and the same errors are
made every year by different taxpayers, it
means that the wording or the sentences, or
even the format of  the tax return may at least
be partly to blame. Slemrod (1989) makes a
similar point to Long (1988) in that he be-
lieves that a simple tax return and simpler tax
regulations could possibly decrease tax eva-
sion especially in a self-assessment system.
A recent study conducted by Isa (2015)
aims to examine the difficulties encountered
by corporate taxpayers in complying with tax
obligations under the self-assessment system
in Malaysia. Three determinants of  the tax
complexity were the tax calculations, the
record keeping requirements and ambiguities
in the taxes. Isa (2015) found that the tax
calculations and record keeping were the big-
gest problems encountered by small firms in
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Malaysia while the third determinant – am-
biguity in the taxes, was normally faced by
medium and large scale firms. The complex-
ity of a tax system is believed to be one of
the determinants in cultivating tax evasion
(Isa 2015: 51) particularly in developing
countries with moderate levels of education.
Isa (2015) then suggested that in order to
minimize tax evasion among corporate tax-
payers, the simplicity of the tax system plays
a major role. Simpler and clearer tax systems
would provide lower compliance costs, hence
reduce tax evasion activities. Therefore, Isa
(2015) suggested that the tax authority should
simplify the tax system, including simplify-
ing the preparation of tax computations, stan-
dardize procedures for record keeping and
formulate clearer tax laws to reduce tax am-
biguities.
Simplifying tax administration is impor-
tant because it can facilitate efficient and
enhanced administration and reduce costs
(Mohani 2001; Bird 1998; Silvani and Baer
1997). In practice, the current stipulated law
and regulations might no longer be relevant
in the future. For example, personal allow-
ances, deductions, tax rates, tax reliefs, tax-
able income and rebates are usually different
each year. Tax regulations and their laws in
most countries are amended almost every year
as part of the annual budget process, this situ-
ation encourages taxpayers to make mistakes.
Thus, noncompliance in terms of  inaccurate
tax returns is not only caused by the taxpay-
ers evasive behavior (either intentional or
unintentional), but may also be because of
the tax authority’s mistakes or weaknesses in
developing and designing the systems.
Interestingly, Richardson (2008) in his
study which extended studies by Riahi-
Belkaoui (2004) and Jackson and Milliron
(1986), found that out of seventeen variables
tested across 45 countries (including age, gen-
der, education, fairness, culture and religion),
complexity was found to be the most impor-
tant determinant of  tax evasion (p. 164). He
therefore concluded that ‘A more simple tax
system and administration can reduce tax
evasion’ (p.165). In summary, as the main
feature of the SAS is the self-completed tax
returns and the taxpayers come from various
backgrounds and levels, therefore simplify-
ing the tax returns and the administration
potentially could help taxpayers to complete
their tax returns accurately and increase com-
pliance. The next subsection describes the
relationship between the probability of de-
tection and compliance.
Hypotheses Development
Hypotheses 1
As per the discussion in section 2, in-
stitutional factors can be classified into three
determinants, namely the role of  the tax au-
thority, the complexity of  the tax system and
the probability of  detection. To date, no con-
clusive evidence has proven how tax authori-
ties can influence taxpayers’ compliance be-
havior, as researchers from different coun-
tries were unable to reach agreement on this
issue. The role of the tax authority in mini-
mizing the tax gap and increasing voluntary
compliance is very important, as Hasseldine
and Li (1999) placed the government and the
tax authority as the main parties that needed
to be continuously efficient in administering
the tax system in order to minimize tax eva-
sion. In the US for example, the IRS view tax
noncompliance as a big challenge and has had
to deal with this carefully as the tax gap has
increased tremendously in the last decade.
The government plays the central role in de-
signing the tax systems, and the enforcement
and collection methods (Hasseldine and Li
Palil et al.
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1999: 93). Furthermore, Roth et al. (1989)
suggested that in order to increase compli-
ance, maximize tax revenues and be respected
by taxpayers, a government must first have
an economical tax system which is practical4;
they must not provoke conflicts and raise
political difficulties, and should have a good
relationship with the international tax re-
gimes. In addition, they must discourage tax
evasion and induce honesty, while avoiding
the tendency to dry up the sources of tax. A
study conducted by Richardson (2006) also
suggested that the role of  the government has
a significant impact on determining attitudes
towards taxes. A simpler tax system intro-
duced by a government can reduce tax eva-
sion. Therefore, following the above discus-
sions, it is hypothesized that:
H
1
: The role (efficiency) of the tax authority is nega-
tively correlated with tax evasion.
Hypotheses 2
Compliance in relation to the probabil-
ity of being detected has received attention
from many researchers. An earlier study by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) claimed that
taxpayers will always declare their income
correctly if the probability of detection is
high. Slemrod, Blumenthal and Christian
(2001) investigated the relationship between
the probability of being detected and the tax-
payers’ responses. The experiment5 indicated
that taxpayers’ behavior varied in terms of
their level of income and the probability of
being detected, which played a significant role
in determining taxpayers’ evasion behavior.
The probability of detection plays a signifi-
cant role in the reporting behavior as taxpay-
ers will declare everything if they perceive
that they will be one of the auditees in that
particular year (Riahi-Belkaoui,2004;
Richardson 2006). However, the direction of
the relationship (positive or negative) was not
clearly stated by Slemrod et al. (1998). This
result (by Slemrod et al.) was also supported
by Andreoni et al. (1998) who also found that
a prior audit experience influenced and de-
creased tax evasion. Conversely, Young
(1994) and Slemrod, Blumenthal and Chris-
tian (2001) found that the probability of be-
ing detected negatively correlated with com-
pliance behavior.
Another study by Yusof  et al. (2014)
attempted to determine the role of  audits in
corporate tax noncompliance among Small
and Medium sized Corporations (SMCs) in
Malaysia. They suggested that the determi-
nants included marginal tax rates, company
size and the types of industry exerted signifi-
cant effects on corporate tax evasion. The
main sectors where tax evasion was encoun-
tered were in the construction and the ser-
vice industries. The amount of  concealed in-
come unearthed during tax audits clearly in-
dicated that there was widespread tax non-
compliance in Malaysia and the quantum of
tax lost through tax noncompliance was quite
high. Therefore, following the above discus-
sions, as well as taking into consideration
Malaysia’s economic environment and cul-
ture, it is hypothesized that:
H
2
: The probability of being detected is negatively
correlated with tax evasion.
4 The government have suitable powers (assessment and collection) to administer the tax system .
5 Using taxpayers’ tax returns for two years to compare the differences in reported income, deductions and tax
liabilities. Random sampling was used.
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Hypotheses 3
As tax systems have become increas-
ingly more complex over time in many devel-
oped countries, complexity has become an
important determinant of  tax compliance
behavior in view of  the institutional factors.
The main feature of the SAS is the self-com-
pleted tax returns which require at least a rea-
sonable level of complexity because taxpay-
ers come from various backgrounds, with dif-
fering levels of income, education, and lev-
els of tax knowledge. In helping taxpayers to
complete the tax returns accurately, the tax
authority should have come up with a simple,
but comprehensive, tax return. The informa-
tion required in the return must be at the mini-
mum necessary level and be readily available
from taxpayers’ business and personal records.
As the tax regulations and laws in most
countries are amended almost every year as
part of their annual budget process, the cur-
rent regulations might no longer be relevant
in the future. For example, tax rates, personal
allowances, deductions, rebates and taxable
income are usually different each year. This
situation will encourage the taxpayers to make
mistakes. Simplifying the tax administration
is important because it can facilitate efficient
and enhanced administration and reduce costs
(Mohani 2001; Bird 1998; Silvani and Baer
1997). Thus, noncompliance in terms of  in-
accurate tax returns is not only caused by tax-
payers evasive behavior (either intentional or
unintentional), but may also be because of
the tax authority’s mistakes or weaknesses in
developing and designing the systems.
Richardson (2008) in his study which ex-
tended the studies by Riahi-Belkaoui (2004)
and Jackson and Milliron (1986), found that
out of seventeen variables tested across 45
countries (including age, gender, education,
fairness, culture and religion), complexity is
found to be the most important determinant
of  tax evasion (p. 164).
He therefore concluded that ‘a more
simple tax system and administration can re-
duce tax evasion’ (p.165). Isa (2015) aimed
to examine the tax difficulties encountered
by corporate taxpayers in complying with
their tax obligations under the self-assessment
system in Malaysia. Three determinants of
tax complexity were the tax calculations, the
required record keeping and tax ambiguities.
Isa (2015) found that the tax calculations and
record keeping were the biggest problems
encountered by small firms in Malaysia while
the third determinant – tax ambiguity was
normally faced by medium and large sized
firms. The complexity of  a tax system is be-
lieved to be one of  the determinants in culti-
vating tax evasion (Isa 2015: 51) particularly
in a developing country with a moderate level
of education. Therefore, following the above
discussions, it is hypothesized that:
H
3
: A simple tax return and tax system is nega-
tively correlated with tax evasion.
Methods
Sampling and Data Collection
The main objective of this study is to
determine the factors involved in tax evasion
by focusing on the institutional perspectives.
The data were collected through a national
survey. A total number of  5,500 mail surveys
were distributed to individual taxpayers
throughout Malaysia, who were selected at
random from telephone directories. Prior to
that, a pilot survey on a group of  23 lectur-
ers and professionals in various sectors and
members of the general public (non-tax spe-
cialists) was conducted to improve the valid-
ity and reliability, as well as to further refine
Palil et al.
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the questions. Kasipillai and Baldry (1998)
asserted that the selection of samples from
local telephone directories may exclude low
income earners who are less likely to have a
telephone.
This suggestion was supported by Wang
and Saunders (2012) who used telephone di-
rectories to select their sample in their study
on Chinese managers in China. Moreover,
Calvert ad Pope (2005) and Forza (2002)
were using telephone directories as their da-
tabase for data collection. However, in the
Malaysian context two factors help to over-
come this potentially results-biasing position.
Firstly, phone ownership is very high and no
‘ex-directory’ service is available whereby
numbers could be unlisted (as typical in the
UK for example) Secondly (and perhaps more
importantly), in Malaysia, many since low
income earners are unlikely to lodge tax re-
turns using the Malaysian SAS, their possible
exclusion from this survey is not considered
to be of major concern, given that the focus
is on taxpayers who have had direct experi-
ence of  the SAS. An individual who earns
less than RM25,501 (USD8,226) per annum
does not have to submit a tax return (IRB
2014). Therefore, taken all together, this sam-
pling method, in this context, leads to a good
randomization with few limitations compared
to other sampling approaches for this scale
of  survey.6
Taking the sample from a telephone di-
rectory is, however, limited in one key out-
put that may alter our results, namely the
possibility of the impact of the growth in
mobile phone ownership which is becoming
significant in Malaysia. Malaysia has the sec-
ond highest mobile penetration in South East
Asia, after Singapore (South East Asian Mo-
bile Communications & Mobile Data Markets
Report 2013). In early 2006, mobile penetra-
tion passed the 80 percen mark, with sub-
scriber numbers at the same time passing 20
million.7 This was up from only 2 million sub-
scribers in 1998. Although the growth of
mobile telephones is significantly higher than
that of landlines, the ownership of landlines
is both classical and traditional – to own a
landline is still considered necessary even in
households which possess more than one
mobile.
Questionnaire Design, Variables
Development and Measurement
The questionnaire was prepared in both
Malay and English versions (in the same
booklet) to facilitate respondents and was
divided into four sections:
Section A – Tax compliance hypothetical
questions
This section consisted of eight hypo-
thetical questions related to tax compliance
behavior. It was developed based on
Troutman (1993) and Chan et al. (2000). The
development of hypothetical questions was
also based on the Choice of Dilemma Ques-
tionnaire (CDQ) developed by Kogan and
Wallach (1964). Kogan and Wallach intro-
duced a series of CDQ questions to examine
human resources risk-based decision making
as follows: The central person (based on
Kogan and Wallach) in each situation is faced
with a choice between two alternative courses
of action. Alternative X is more desirable
6 Alternatively, a list of  taxpayers could be obtained from the tax authority. However, it is very difficult to obtain
the list as the tax authority is not allowed by the Income Tax Act 1967 to reveal any taxpayers information to the public.
7  Total population in 2000 was 23.27 million compared to 18.38 in 1990 (27.15% increase) (The Population and
Housing Census 2000). This figure increased to 27.46 million in 2008 (Malaysia Department of Statistics, 2008).
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and attractive than alternative Y, but the prob-
ability of achieving X is less than that of
achieving Y. For each situation, respondents
are asked to indicate the minimum probabil-
ity of success they would require before rec-
ommending that alternative X be chosen.
Respondents are asked to indicate their choice
on a ten-point scale that ranges from 1 (risk
averse) to 10 (risk seeker). Responses from
this instrument are summed to derive a rela-
tive measure of  a risk aversion personality.
The CDQ test has been used in various stud-
ies such as decision making (risk taking) by
Cartwright (1971), and human resources man-
agement (Nutt 1986).
The choice-dilemma paradigm that
CDQ is based upon is also suitable to be used
in this study. However, some modifications
of the hypothetical questions have been un-
dertaken so that the variables used in this
study were in line with the research questions.
The degree of adaptation of Kogan and
Wallach’s CDQ was limited to the style of
the questionnaire’s development, as it did not
focus on moral reasoning or risk aversion. For
example, respondents were required to indi-
cate their actions in relation to tax compli-
ance behavior (i.e does the probability of
being audited encourage taxpayers to be more
compliant?)
Section B – Tax knowledge questions
Section B of the questionnaire con-
sisted of 37 questions related to the
respondent’s level of  tax knowledge and was
primarily based on Section 4 (a) to (f) of the
Income Tax Act 19678 as well as studies con-
ducted by Harris (1989); Eriksen and Falllan
(1996); Loo (2006); Loo and Ho (2005). (See
also Mohamad Ali et al. (2007) and Devos
(2008) who also used a similar approach).
Harris (1989) conducted an experiment (the
association between tax knowledge and the
perception of the fairness of the tax system)
using video, divided into two phases. Each
subject was given 10 scenarios using a 10
point Likert scale ranging from 0 (‘allowing
this deduction is extremely unfair’) to 10
(‘allowing this deduction is extremely fair’).
Eriksen and Fallan (1996) in their quasi-ex-
periment measured tax knowledge by pre and
post experiment testingtax knowledge using
a score calculated from 12 questions (post-
test 28 questions) related to tax allowances
and tax liabilities. Instead of  a 5 point Likert
scale, Eriksen and Fallan used ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and
‘Do not Know’ scales in measuring the level
of tax knowledge. Those who answered ‘Do
not know’ would receive a score of 2.
Section C – Tax compliance direct
questions
Section C consisted of 26 direct ques-
tions related to tax compliance behavior. The
variables (i.e. the predictors being explored)
remained the same as in Section A (hypotheti-
cal questions). This section was developed
to examine the taxpayers’ responses to direct
questions, to complement the hypothetical
questions in Section A as well as to enhance
the validity and reliability of the data obtained
from Section A’s questions. This ‘direct ques-
tions’ approach was based on Troutman
(1993) and Chan et al. (2000). A comparison
of the results for both Section A and C will
1 Section 4. Classes of income on which tax is chargeable.
“Subject to this Act, the income upon which tax is chargeable under this Act is income in respect of: (a) gains or profits
from a business, for whatever period of time carried on; (b) gains or profits from an employment; (c) dividends; interest
or discounts; (d) rents, royalties or premium; (e) pensions, annuities or other periodical payments not falling under any
of the foregoing paragraphs; (f) gains or profits not falling under any of the foregoing paragraphs.”
Palil et al.
198
be made in the following chapter. This sec-
tion required the respondents to answer us-
ing a Likert scale ranging from 1 (‘strongly
disagree’) to 5 (‘strongly agree’).9
Section D – Respondents’ background
The final section (Section D) consisted
of the demographic variables including age,
gender, income, educational background, and
some background information on the
respondent’s tax history. These variables be-
came the independent variables in further
analysis so that an association between these
demographic variables and tax knowledge and
tax compliance could be analyzed.
 A total of three tax compliance deter-
minants (independent variables) were exam-
ined as illustrated in Table 1, namely the prob-
ability of being detected (E1), the role of the
tax authority (E2) and the complexity of the
tax system (E3).
To test the hypotheses as outlined in
Section 3, the data was analyzed using mul-
tiple regressions [Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS)]. Equation 1 was used as the base re-
gression model to test the hypotheses and
establish the tax evasion determinants.
TE
i
 =  + 
1
PROBDETECT
i 
+

2 
ROLE
i
 + 
3
SIMPLE
 i
+ 
 i
..... ...(1)
where, TE
i 
is
 
tax evasion score;
PROBDETECT
i 
is Probability of being de-
tected; ROLE
i
 is The role of the tax author-
ity; SIMPLE
i 
is
 
Perception of the complexity
of the tax system
Table 1. A Description of  The Variables
9 Compliant taxpayers were measured if  they answered ‘Agree’ (5 on the Likert scale) or ‘Strongly disagree’ (1 on
the Likert scale) depending on the questions.
Variables Symbol Descriptions 
Tax evasion 
(Dependent 
variable) 
TE Total score was derived through a set of 26 
direct questions. Minimum total score for each 
respondent is 26 (1 mark times 26 questions –
non-compliant) and maximum total score is 130 
(5 times 26 questions– very compliant) 
 
Probability of 
being detected 
(E1) 
PROBDETECT Probability of a taxpayer being detected or 
investigated by the tax authority. Minimum 
score is 1 (non-complaint), and maximum is 15 
(very complaint) 
 
The role of the 
tax authority 
(E2) 
ROLE The role of the tax authority in administering 
the tax system (efficiency, refunds, response to 
complaints, customer services etc). Minimum 
score is 1 (non-complaint), and maximum is 15 
(very complaint) 
   
Complexity of 
tax system  (E3)  
SIMPLE Taxpayers’ perceptions on the complexity of the 
tax system or tax returns. Minimum score is 1 
(non-complaint), and maximum is 15 (very 
complaint) 
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Results
From the surveys distributed, 71 were
returned because they were incorrectly ad-
dressed, or the intended respondents had
moved or died. Out of the other 1,106 sur-
veys returned, 1,073 representing 19.51 per-
cent of the total sample were usable and
could be further analyzed. In terms of  the
number of  surveys distributed, 5,500 was far
from the total population of Malaysia, par-
ticularly the individual taxpayers who num-
bered 5,561,08610 in 2011 (IRB Annual Re-
port 2011). However, a past study (Loo 2006)
showed that using such a number of ques-
tionnaires for the sample distribution was
large enough to represent the individual tax-
payers in Malaysia. In addition, Sekaran
(2000: 295) suggested that the optimum
sample size for a total population of one mil-
lion should be 384 or 0.0384 percent (p.295).
Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008) provided
some guidelines as to the minimum sample
size needed for accurate predictions using
multiple regressions. They suggested that in
order to obtain a valid and good prediction
using multiple regressions, the size of the
sample should be determined by the number
of  predictors in the multiple regressions. As
this study attempted to analysis three predic-
tors, Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008) sug-
gested that the size of the sample should be
900 (see Knofczynski and Mundfrom (2008),
p. 438).
The respondents comprised of 588
(55%) females, 483 (45%) males while 2 re-
spondents did not mention their gender. The
majority of the respondents were Malays with
910 (85%), followed by Chinese, Indian and
other ethnicities with 84 (8%), 44 (4%) and
32 (3%) respectively. There were eight age
groups involved in this study with a 5-year
range in each group except for the ‘above 56
years old’ category. The largest group of  re-
spondents, (252 or 24%) was aged between
26 and 30 years old and respondents in the
group above 56 years old had the lowest num-
ber with 14 responses (1%). Cumulatively,
respondents aged between 20 and 40 years
old made up the largest portion with 749 re-
sponses (70%). A total of 768 (72%) respon-
dents were married, 280 (26%) were single
and 20 (2%) were widows/widowers. The
majority (944, 88%) of the respondents
earned less than RM6,000 per month, while
64 (6%) respondents had a monthly income
10 This figure is based on total number of tax returns distributed to registered individual taxpayers.
Table 2. Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Dependent (TE) and Independent Vari-
ables
 
1 2 3 4 
1. TE 1    
2. PROBDETECT -0.297(**) 1   
  ROLE  0.073(**) -0.012 1  
4. SIMPLE 0.391(**) 0.383(**) -0.097(**) 1 
 
Note: *  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); **  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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of more than RM6,000. Only 19 (2%) earned
more than RM10,000 per month.11
Table 2 illustrates the Pearson correla-
tion matrix for dependent and independent
variables. Based on Table 2, it provides the
results of  the tax evasion determinants in
which all the independent variables were
found to be significantly correlated with TE
(p < 0.01). The coefficient of correlation
between each independent variable and TE
was stable at between r= 0.073 to r= -0.391.
The highest correlation occurred between TE
and SIMPLE (r= -0.391) followed by
PROBDETECT and ROLE.
Based on the stepwise multiple regres-
sions, the results in Table 3 indicate that the
model is significant at the p < 0.01 level (F
statistic 114.835), while R is estimated at
0.424. The results suggested that tax evasion
was influenced by two variables namely
PROBDETECT, and SIMPLE. The stepwise
multiple regression also suggests that SIMPLE
becomes the main factor with a Beta coeffi-
cient of 1.357 followed by PROBDETECT
(b= -0.263). The findings of this study sug-
gest that the role of the Malaysian govern-
ment in minimizing tax evasion is minimal
with an insignificant Beta coefficient. There-
fore, based on the institutional factors ap-
proach, the study reveals that the probability
of being detected and a simple tax system in
Malaysia would minimize tax evasion activi-
ties among the individual taxpayers. A high
probability of being detected and a simple
tax administration would discourage tax eva-
sion. In contrast, the Government’s adminis-
tration style might potentially increase tax
evasion i.e. through the mismanagement of
taxpayers’ funds, unnecessary spending and
other wasteful schemes.
Notes: Dependent variable – Tax evasion
* Significant at p < 0.10; ** Significant at p < 0.05; *** Significant at p < 0.01
 Multiple Regression Stepwise Multiple Regression 
Variables 
Coefficient 
 
t VIF 
Coefficient 
 
T VIF 
(Constant) 24.596 38.415  25.314 63.819  
PROBDETECT -0.265 -5.756** 1.173 -0.263** 10.773 1.172 
ROLE 0.069 1.428 1.010    
SIMPLE 1.339 -10.582** 1.184 1.357** 5.716 1.172 
       
Model fit:       
    R 0.424   0.422   
    R2 0.180   0.178   
    Adjusted R2 0.177   0.177   
    Std. error 4.218   4.220   
   F statistic 77.312**   114.835**   
 
Table 3. Multiple Regression and Stepwise Multiple Regression – Factors Affecting Tax
Evasion
11 The average income for all regions is approximately between RM2,001 – RM4,000 per month.
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In order to validate the study, a non-
response bias test was conducted. Non-re-
sponse bias can often occur in surveys and
interviews and it requires careful manage-
ment in order to produce valid and reliable
results (Sydow 2006 and Donzë 2002). Pre-
vious studies (see Biemer 2001; Saris and
Hagenaars 1997) have attempted to deter-
mine if there is a difference between the re-
spondents and the non-respondents, and re-
ported that people who responded to surveys
may answer questions differently to those
who do not. They have also found that late
responders may answer differently than early
responders, and that the differences may be
due to the different levels of interest in the
subject matter. Most researchers view non-
response bias as a continuum, ranging from
fast responders to slow responders (with non-
responders defining the end of the con-
tinuum). There are a number of non-response
bias measurements such as an extrapolation
to estimate the magnitude of bias created by
non-responses, and the use of a mixed
method data collection (using different meth-
ods of data collection during research, such
as questionnaires and phone interviews) (see
Donzë 2002). Thus, in order to validate,
verify and increase the reliability and explana-
tory power of the results, following Donzë
(2002);12 Li and Prabhala (2005)13 and Sydow
(2006),14 and due to limitations such as dif-
ferent questionnaire designs and research
objectives, this study measured the non-re-
sponse bias through two types of responses,
namely ‘before follow up calls’15 and ‘after
follow up calls’. Based on the analysis, the
Levene’s test16 indicated that the majority of
the responses were insignificant which mean
that the variances of the variables were con-
stant (no significant variance different be-
tween the before follow up and after follow
up calls). Thus it can be said that non-re-
sponse bias does not occur in this data. In
addition, the ANOVA analysis for all the vari-
ables measured was also insignificant In con-
clusion, the ANOVA test results were suffi-
ciently powerful to accept the null hypoth-
esis in which there was no significant mean
difference between responses received from
non-followed up and followed up respon-
dents. Thus, a non-response bias did not oc-
cur in this study.
12 Donzë (2002) attempted to introduce the methodology to correct non-response in research on KOF ETH
(Swiss Economic Institute) Zurich’s survey in year 2000 by using ‘weighting factors’ in his logit linear regression model.
13 Li and Prabhala (2005) reviewed the econometric model of self selection in corporate finance research particu-
larly in random sampling. Issues such as sample selection and non-response bias were the focal point of  the research.
14 Sydow (2006) extended Donzë’s study by collecting the same data from the same dataset of  population (KOF
ETH Zurich). A mixed method approach (self  administered questionnaires and phone interviews) was also employed.
She exercised Chi square (÷2) and McNemar’s test and Logit models.
15 Like Donzë (2002) and Sydow (2006), responses received without any follow up calls were categorized as
‘respondent’ while responses received after follow up calls made were categorized as ‘non-respondent’
16 Levene’s test is used to test the homogeneity of  variance. If  the result is insignificant (p > 0,05), it means that
the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance cannot be rejected. Therefore the variances of the variables are constant.
Thus the assumption of non-response bias does not occur in this data (Hair et.al. 2006:432, 438; Hong 2005:75-76;
Sekaran 2000:319)
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Summary and Concluding
Remarks
The objective of this study was to ex-
amine the determinants of  tax evasion from
the institutional perspectives. Three poten-
tial determinants of  tax evasion were exam-
ined in this study, namely the probability of
being detected, the role of the tax authority
and the complexity of the tax system. The
results suggested that tax evasion was signifi-
cantly influenced by the probability of being
detected and the complexity of the tax sys-
tem. Interestingly, the complexity of  the tax
system played a bigger role in decreasing eva-
sion compared to the probability of detec-
tion (refer Table 3) thus, H
3
 (a simple tax re-
turn and tax system is negatively correlated with
tax evasion) is accepted. This study also sug-
gested that a high probability of being de-
tected could minimize tax evasion activities.
On the other hand, this study evidenced that
a simpler tax system could possibly reduce
tax evasion and instill voluntary compliance
among taxpayers. This result also suggested
that other variables, such as the role of the
tax authority, was no longer a significant vari-
able in predicting tax evasion some years af-
ter the introduction of a SAS and thus, H
1
(the role (efficiency) of the tax authority is positively
correlated with tax compliance) is rejected.
With regards to the probability of be-
ing detected, previous studies [for example,
Allingham and Sandmo (1972); Jackson and
Jaouen (1989); Shanmugam (2003); Dubin
(2004); Riahi-Belkaoui (2004); Richardson
(2006).; Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998);
Bergman (1998); Verboon, and van Dijke
(2007); Eisenhauer (2008)], have found that
a high probability of being detected would
encourage taxpayers to be more compliant (a
positive relationship) but some other studies
found contradictory results i.e. a high prob-
ability of being detected would potentially
decrease compliance, creating a negative as-
sociation (for example Young (1994), and
Slemrod et al. (2001), Braithwaite et al.
(2009). In addition, Slemrod et al. (1998) did
not clearly state the direction (either positive
or negative). Therefore, since a high probabil-
ity of being detected could discourage tax
evasion, the tax authority should increase
their number of audit samples so that tax
evasion would decrease, the tax gap would
decrease and the mission of the SAS would
be achieved.
In this study, other variables such as the
role of the tax authority appear not to be sig-
nificantly correlated with tax evasion deci-
sions, even though previous studies in other
countries found significant associations (see
Harris (1989). Governments play a central
role through designing and enforcing their tax
systems, and collecting taxes (Hasseldine and
Li 1999: 93). For example, the role of  the tax
authority in minimizing the tax gap and in-
creasing voluntary compliance was found to
be very important as Hasseldine and Li
(1999) placed the government as the main
influencing factor in relation to tax evasion.
Tis study has made a contribution to the
tax compliance literature by demonstrating
the determinants of  tax evasion using a SAS
in a developing country in order to increase
voluntary compliance. This study can suggest
specific areas where the education of others
may help to increase the overall levels of
voluntary compliance using the SAS. This
study further contributes by providing evi-
dence of  other key tax evasion determinants
in a developing country, particularly in Asian
countries that were previously under re-
searched. These determinants, it is claimed
may affect tax compliance behavior. The find-
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ings of this research could also be used as a
reference for any tax regime in order to im-
prove the management of their tax system.
The results of this study are also useful
in helping a tax authority to design the best
mechanism for delivering the latest informa-
tion on tax regulations (i.e. advertisements
in the media, websites, brochures and cus-
tomer services desks) and also in achieving
its goals in deciding to change the collection
system to one using a SAS. It is also impor-
tant for the tax authority to be kept informed
of taxpayers’ levels of knowledge so that it
can effectively and efficiently communicate
(i.e. current changes in tax laws) and design
tax policies (for example, the tax rates, filing
requirements, penalties etc.).
It is acknowledged that this study has a
number of  limitations. The use of  a self-re-
porting survey might be less reliable, espe-
cially when the information sought (tax) is
sensitive, potentially incriminating or embar-
rassing (Richardson 2008). The actual behav-
ior of the subjects may vary from the re-
sponses given. While acknowledging this con-
straint, however, it is believed that this is the
most suitable way to predict the taxpayers’
compliance behavior, as direct questions (face
to face) might lead the respondents to answer
the questions dishonestly and could be po-
tentially embarrassing for the respondents.
Using telephone directories potentially lim-
its responses through only getting the head
of the households; also replies from landline
telephone owners tend to include only the
richer groups in the society. However, this
issue has been balanced by a high number of
usable responses (1,073) which is relatively
high compared to other similar tax studies.
Future research could be conducted via a lon-
gitudinal study in which a comparison of
more years might provide different results
from this ‘point in time’ study. For example a
study into how changes in levels of tax
knowledge, taxpayers’ financial situations and
changes to the tax laws and regulations po-
tentially affect compliance decisions could be
beneficial. Using data from the tax adminis-
tration and comparing this with data from
questionnaires could also be beneficial as a
further data source for a compliance study
of this kind, although the chances of access-
ing data from the tax authority are very slim.
In conclusion, although various studies have
been undertaken to determine as accurately
as possible the factors that impact upon tax
compliance behavior, undoubtedly, the Gov-
ernment should seriously consider the char-
acteristics of non-compliant taxpayers, review
the current regulations and possibly as a re-
sult, increase audit rates and penalty rates
(enforcement) as well as attempt to build
good relationships with the taxpayers in seek-
ing to improve the general tax compliance
levels.
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